Size Matters: Multifamily players weigh
placemaking and economies of scale against the increasingly complex
operations and vocal opposition to the creation of
megacommunities.
By: Chris Wood
September 2010
Credit: Jordan Mantzke
On March 11, Forest City Ratner Cos. Chairman and CEO Bruce
Ratner put his full weight onto the edge of a steel spade and
pushed ceremoniously into the Brooklyn dirt, breaking ground on the
Barclays Center arena—the future home of the New Jersey Nets
and the centerpiece of Atlantic Yards, a titanic mixed-use urban
infill project that will ultimately include 6,430 multifamily
housing units in 16 high-rise towers across 22 acres of Big Apple
real estate. In a show of business, civic, and cultural coalescence
around the project, Ratner was joined at the groundbreaking by New
York Gov. David Patterson; New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg;
Brooklyn Borough President Marty Markowitz; Barclays President
Robert E. Diamond Jr.; and Nets investor and Grammy-winning hip-hop
icon Shawn “Jay-Z” Carter. These heavyweights, in one
aspect or another, are all publicly lending their support to New
York City’s latest megacommunity.
That’s not to say that everyone is a fan of Atlantic
Yards, or megacommunities in general, which altruistically are
intended to deliver culturally identifiable
“placemaking” neighborhoods to thousands of renters
while allowing for economies of scale in construction and operating
costs, but in practice are perennially fraught with financial
difficulties, landlord/tenant strife, physical upkeep challenges,
and intensely focused and litigation-minded NIMBYism (particularly
during design and development). Plans for Atlantic Yards, for
example, were first announced in 2003, and it wasn’t just the
economic collapse that has stalled the project some six years from
its originally scheduled rollout.
“The opposition for this project committed to suing early
and often to stop the project, and they lived up to their
commitment,” says Maryanne Gilmartin, Forest City
Ratner’s executive vice president of commercial and
residential development, referring to Develop, Don’t Destroy,
Brooklyn, the nonprofit coalition that unsuccessfully took Forest
City through state and federal courts over alleged eminent domain
abuses. These claims were ultimately rejected via a U.S. Supreme
Court refusal to hear the case on appeal and a New York Appeals
Court November 2009 ruling that was likewise in the
developer’s favor.
“We always anticipate a certain level of conflict that
comes with the territory in developing large-scale projects. You
definitely need to be thick-skinned and hunker down for the long
haul,” Gilmartin says. “None of what we do is simple,
straightforward, or quick. This is not a guppy in the scheme of
development projects; it is a whale.”
Big Properties, Big
Problems
A look across the roster of American
megacommunities—those projects that are often larger than
many small cities, involving multifamily unit counts ranging from
roughly 2,000 to 15,000 units (see “Jumbo Sized,”
below)—confirms Gilmartin’s summation that these
powerhouse projects are anything but simple and
straightforward.
Mostly built at the conclusion of World War II to house
returning servicemen and their families, megacommunities seek to
alleviate the ever-present shortage of affordable housing in the
country’s biggest metropolitan areas. While their age makes
ongoing physical improvements a complex necessity, most assets have
enjoyed historically high occupancy and cash flow from residents
eager to identify themselves with the communities.
That cash flow likewise continues to attract investors and
developers who see cost-savings in the economies of scale at such
large properties. But from operations to capital structure, the
behemoth size that makes mega projects so appealing from an
economies-of-scale standpoint also means that minor problems take
very little catalyzing to become full-blown catastrophes in
communities that are often larger than many small
cities.
Take the Bronx’s Co-Op City, the nation’s largest
apartment cooperative community, accommodating nearly 60,000
residents with 15,372 units across 35 high-rise buildings. In June,
the community faced a sanitation nightmare when contract
negotiations stalled between the property’s management firm,
New York-based RiverBay Corp., and unionized garbage collectors,
janitors, repairmen, and groundskeepers. In the space of 72 hours,
some 100 tons of garbage accumulated on Co-Op City streets. Fearing
an explosion in the rodent population as the summer heat bore down
on refuse piles more than 5 feet high, the Health Department
finally declared the site a health hazard and mandated garbage
collection, even as new contracts had yet to be
finalized.
Hop on the subway and head south, and you’ll see that
problems continue to plague Stuyvesant Town/Peter Cooper Village,
the post-war mega complex of 11,227 rental units across 52
buildings constructed by New York-based Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co. in 1947 and sold in October 2006 to a New York-based Tishman
Speyer/BlackRock joint venture for $5.4 billion. The deal continues
to hold the distinction of being the largest U.S. apartment
transaction to date—and one that many multifamily real estate
observers in and outside of New York wonder should ever have been
consummated.
Going, Going, Gone
Politics, ongoing litigation, and delinquencies overshadow the
pending auction of Stuyvesant Town/Peter Cooper
Village.
On June 21, federal district court judge Alvin Hellerstein
granted a summary judgment foreclosure on the 11,227-unit
Stuyvesant Town/Peter Cooper Village megacommunity. The motion for
foreclosure by special servicer Needham, Mass.-based CW Capital was
unopposed by the property’s joint venture ownership group of
New York-based Tishman Speyer and BlackRock, which defaulted on a
$300 million mortgage payment in January and requests that the
property be auctioned in one or two parcels to cover the senior
mortgage, litigation costs, and late fees.
While reports have surfaced that Freddie Mac might be
interested in providing financing for the property, most market
watchers speculate that private equity will again win out in the
bid for the project. Some also believe that CW Capital—which
would be, in essence, paying itself—will come to the bidding
table with the upper-hand.
Regardless of where ownership of the complex ultimately settles
out, industry pundits expect the fallout to continue to impact
apartment finance and disposition barometers and
metrics.
How tumultuous of an effect can one property have on an entire
industry? In February, the apartment sector’s delinquency
rate climbed to an all-time high of 8.97 percent, according to
Fitch Ratings. When factoring in the delinquency of the Stuyvesant
Town/Peter Cooper Village default, the rate climbed to more than 13
percent.
Further complicating the StuyTown scenario is a Manhattan State
Supreme Court ruling levied on August 5 that allows a class action
lawsuit against the complex’s developer and former owner
MetLife to proceed. That suit seeks $215 million for improper rent
overcharges as the result of alleged improper deregulation of units
under rent control, similar in nature to a successful suit filed
against the Tishman Speyer/BlackRock JV that led in part to the
demise of that $5.4 billion deal.
“No one wants to touch these mega properties in
default,” says Dan Fasulo, managing director and head of
global research for New York-based Real Capital Analytics.
“They have become politicized properties. The last thing you
want is a senator setting up a conference in front of your
building, and that is what everyone is scared to death of. On their
merits, they are tremendous commercial properties that should have
a line around the corner of white knights who want to recapitalize
them, but politics have crept in and no one wants to touch
them.”
In fact, the Stuyvesant Town ownership group announced this
January that it would miss making payments on some $3 billion in
senior mortgage debt after attempts to deregulate approximately
4,400 apartments that were vacant or turning between lessors was
found by the New York State Supreme Court to be in conflict with
J-51 tax abatements granted to the property.
“The market is speaking back that the price paid in the
previous transaction of $5.4 billion was not a sustainable price
based on the income stream of the property, so the market is
revaluing it, and the property has a lesser value,” says
Patrick Siconolfi, executive director of New York’s Community
Housing Improvement Program. “I’ve heard anecdotally
that value might be around $2 billion, but I couldn’t know,
and we won’t know until the market tests
it.”
That market test will likely come sooner rather than later. On
June 21, federal judge Alvin Hellerstein granted a foreclosure
motion by the Stuyvesant Town/Peter Cooper Village mortgage’s
special servicer, Needham, Mass.-based CW Capital, ordering that
the property be sold via auction in either one or two parcels (see
“Going, Going, Gone” on page 36).
New York isn’t the only metro area feeling the pain from
megacommunities. In San Francisco, the 3,221-unit Parkmerced is
finding simultaneous difficulty both with jump-starting a 20-year
re-greening/value-add retrofit that could add up to 7,000
additional units as well as simply making mortgage payments on the
$687 million plopped down in October 2005 for the property by a
joint venture between New York-based Stellar Management and
Boston-based Rockpoint Group. In May, Stellar Management
representatives confirmed to the San Francisco Chronicle that they
had engaged an unnamed special servicer to assist with the prospect
of defaulting on an estimated $500 million in combined mortgage
debt coming due in October 2010. Industry blog CRE Review notes
that at year-end 2009, the property was clearing $30 million in NOI
at near 100 percent occupancy—not enough to cover loans
underwritten to $40 million NOI.
Although the public eye remains fixated on the problems of
these properties, that’s not to say that current owners of
embattled megacommunities haven’t strived to make their
respective deals work out. Co-Op City has resolved its contract
issues and remains the first, largest, and arguably most successful
apartment cooperative experiment in history, with a waiting list
for units that can last more than a year. For all of the legal
wrangling and capitalization issues, market observers of the
unfolding Stuyvesant Town/Peter Cooper Village drama say the
physical condition of the property remains top-notch. (The Tishman
Speyer/BlackRock ownership group declined to comment on current
occupancy levels.) And the Stellar Management/Rockpoint Group has
often been recognized for bringing Parkmerced back from the brink
of deterioration after original developer New York-based MetLife
sold the community to Leona Helmsley in the 1970s. (The developers,
owners, management groups, and special servicers involved in these
three projects’ past, present, and future declined to comment
for this article.)
Management maneuvers
Even firms finding success with megacommunities sympathize with
the fish-out-of-water complex that many owners experience when
balancing how a multi-thousand-unit deal pencils out financially on
paper, with the complex management and operational systems of the
physical property.
“Take everything you know about property management and
just throw it out the window,” attests Greg Lozinak, chief
operating officer for Chicago-based Waterton Residential, which
tapped into a private equity fund in 2007 for the $470 million
purchase of Chicago’s Presidential Towers from the Pritzker
Realty Group.
Built in 1986, the 2,346-unit complex spans four 50-story
towers that encompass two city blocks in Chicago’s
revitalized West Loop and features a five-story garage, three-story
atrium, and more than 100,000 square feet of commercial retail
space. Currently at 95 percent occupancy, the property employs 72
full-time on-site associates. Prior to the Presidential Towers
acquisition, the largest complex Waterton Residential took on was
936 units. “From a systems standpoint and a customer service
standpoint, the traditional garden apartment strategy of assigning
one associate per 20 or 30 residents just doesn’t apply when
you get beyond 1,000 or so units,” Lozinak says. “You
are talking about a much larger allocation of
resources.”
Forest City Ratner executives are weighing the pros and cons of
that resource allocation as they determine whether to self-manage
or fee-manage the residential components of Atlantic Yards,
construction of which is slated to commence next year with a
projected development timeline of 10-plus years. While the firm has
a proven track record managing for its own accounts, its real
estate footprint in New York City is primarily in the office
sector, and the company does not have residential management
offices currently located in the market.
“It is something that we are still studying,”
Gilmartin says. “We like to be in control; we are very
high-quality managers of our properties; and we have a high
standard associated with our management. There are maybe three
companies that might be able to step up in a way that would satisfy
us. Because of that, and because of the fact that you are talking
about critical mass here, it is a business model that you could
develop and build upon over time. This really begs the question:
Why not do it yourself?”
Housing agencies with input on the continued development of
megacommunities are also beginning to look more closely at on-site
management when it comes to allocating development contracts to
bidders. At Hunters Point South, just up the East River from
Atlantic Yards, the New York City Department of Housing
Preservation and Development (HPD) has issued a request for
proposal (RFP) on the first 1,000-unit phase of a planned
5,000-unit community build-out and is weighing how many private
developers, owners, and (ultimately) property managers control
property on the site as part of the RFP process.
“Over history, we have done it two different ways,”
says HPD Commissioner Rafael E. Cestero. “We have done it on
a site-by-site basis with individual RFPs for one or two sites with
multiple developers participating, and we have also done it where
we select a single developer to build out an entire new community
over multiple phases. Because of the size of the 600-unit buildings
and development parcels in Queens, we are more likely to end up
with a hybrid of those models, involving just a couple of
developers over the course of the project. Not one, but also not
half a dozen.”
According to Cestero, each community is different, and the
decision to go with a single, a select few, or multiple developers
is site- and economy-dependant and evolves in conjunction with each
mega project.
One of those developers could be Alexandria, Va.-based
AvalonBay Communities, which has filed a bid for the first
1,000-unit phase at Hunters Point. “AvalonBay has really been
no stranger to pretty large-scale buildings, and in terms of
capital deployment and long-term strategy, we are very fond of
these multi-phase deals,” says Fred Harris, the REIT’s
senior vice president of development. “These developments
capture where people want to be today. [Testament to that] is the
surprisingly low interest and relatively small requirement for
parking spaces at a lot of these buildings. It tells you that
people are really looking at some of this as a lifestyle
choice.”
A Sense of Community
Indeed, even while faced with recapitalization woes,
tenant/landlord feuds, huge operating budgets, and disgruntled
neighbors, the developers, civic leaders, and financiers behind
megacommunities continue to stress their relevance, particularly
when it comes to placemaking and community building in an
increasingly socially fragmented and detached society.
Major Makeover: Currently undergoing a 10-year renovation
program by Chicago-based Waterton Associates, Presidential Towers
in Chicago comprise 2,346 market-rate apartments in four 50-story
towers across two entire city blocks.
“These kinds of communities allow people to have a more
well-defined sense of place,” Cestero says. “Whether
you are talking about [New York’s] Battery Park City or
Starrett City or Stuyvesant Town/Peter Cooper Village, there is a
very strong sense of community that residents are attracted to. You
get that less so with infill, scatter-shot development. There is a
softer side to why we do this, and it is creating that sense of
place and that sense of community that people can gravitate to and
connect to in a really important way.”
Affordability will factor largely in the success of current and
future megacommunities, in part to ensure the placemaking ventures
of the few can be experienced by the masses, particularly those who
work in and serve the communities in which they live. Forest City
has committed 2,250 of Atlantic Yards’ 6,430 units to that
end, and Gilmartin pledges the affordability rollout will be
aggressive and consistent.
“It’s not as if we will wait until the latter years
to produce the levels of affordability that we expect to produce
here at Atlantic Yards,” she says. “We expect that the
very first building will have a generous amount of affordability
associated with it, in large part because it is our commitment to
the community that we will build affordable housing. If we do our
jobs well, this can become a model for how it can be accomplished
here in New York City and in other places. We’re excited
about it. We believe in it. And we take the responsibility very
seriously.”
Reprinted with permission from Multifamily Executive, a
publication of Hanley Wood Business Media © September,
2010